Cost savings of unit-based pricing of household waste; the case of the Netherlands by Dijkgraaf, E. (Elbert) & Gradus, R.H.J.M. (Raymond)
 
 
COST SAVINGS OF UNIT-BASED PRICING 
OF HOUSEHOLD WASTE 
The case of the Netherlands* 
 
 
 
E. Dijkgraaf, Research Center for Economic Policy (OCFEB)1 
R.H.J.M. Gradus, OCFEB and Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment 
 
 
 
                                                          
Version: 5 June 2003 
 
Using a panel data set for Dutch municipalities we estimate effects for weight-based, 
bag-based, frequency-based and volume-based pricing of household waste collection. 
Unit-based pricing shows to be effective in reducing solid and compostable and 
increasing recyclable waste. Pricing has no effect on the waste collected in surrounding 
municipalities (waste tourism). However, unit-based pricing may lead to illegal 
dumping. While empirical evidence is scarce, a social cost-benefit analysis shows that if 
the social valuation of illegal dumping is in line with the social costs for collecting and 
treating solid waste, the weight or bag-based systems are preferable. 
 
JEL classification: H31, H71, Q38 
 
Keywords: municipal waste management, social welfare, unit-based pricing systems 
 
* We thank the Dutch Waste Management Council (AOO) and Maarten Allers 
(University of Groningen) for their help providing some of the data and Maarten Allers, 
Loek Bergman (Ministry of Environmental Affairs) and Peter Kooreman (University of 
Groningen) for their comments on an earlier version. 
  
1  OCFEB, Erasmus University Rotterdam, H6-11, P.O. box 1738, 3000 DR Rotterdam, the 
Netherlands, Tel.: (31) 10 4082590, Fax: (31) 10 4089173, Email: dijkgraaf@few.eur.nl. 
 
 
 
Research Memorandum 0209 
 
 
 
 
 
OCFEB 
Room  H6-20 
Erasmus University Rotterdam 
P.O. Box 1738 
3000 DR Rotterdam 
The Netherlands 
Telephone +31 10 408 2430 
Telefax  +31 10 408 9173 
E-mail  info@ocfeb.nl 
Website  www.ocfeb.nl 
 
Table of contents 
 
 
 
1. Introduction ............................................................................................................. 5 
2.  Effects of unit-based pricing.................................................................................... 6 
2.1 Method and data ........................................................................................... 6 
2.2  Results .......................................................................................................... 9 
3. Some further discussion of the results ................................................................... 11 
3.1  The price elasticities of the weight-based system....................................... 11 
3.2 The importance of political variables ......................................................... 12 
3.3 Is there an effect on surrounding municipalities?....................................... 13 
3.4 Illegal dumping .......................................................................................... 14 
3.5  The social costs and benefits of volume pricing......................................... 15 
4.  Conclusions ........................................................................................................... 18 
APPENDIX.................................................................................................................... 20 
REFERENCES............................................................................................................... 21 
 
  
  
1. Introduction 
 
More and more Dutch communities have implemented unit-based user fees to finance 
waste collection. These user fees require households to pay for each kilogram, bag or 
container presented at the curb for collection. In 2000 more than 20% of all Dutch 
municipalities have implemented such a system. In this paper we estimate household 
reactions to the implementation of unit-based pricing for the collection of residential 
waste. Our estimates show significant and sizeable price effects. 
 
In the literature two lines of thought can be distinguished, which estimate household 
reactions to the implementation of unit-based pricing systems. A first stream of 
literature uses cross-sections analyses of municipalities (e.g. Wertz (1976), Jenkins 
(1993), Podolsky and Speigel (1998), Kinnaman and Fullerton (1997)). A second 
stream of literature tries to use household survey data (e.g. Hong et al. (1993), 
Reschovky and Stone (1994), Fullerton and Kinnaman (1996), Linderhof et al. (2001)). 
Most of the studies show considerable impact of a pricing system. 
 
Recently, Linderhof et al. (2001) published the effects of weight-based pricing for 
Oostzaan, the first Dutch municipality that implemented weight-based pricing in 1993. 
They find significant price effects and conclude that the implementation yields 
significant social benefits. They show that weight-based pricing is effective in reducing 
especially compostable waste (vegetable, fruit and garden waste) and increasing 
recyclable waste (glass, textile and paper). One question, which is raised, is how 
representative Oostzaan is to the rest of the country. In this article we will show that 
Oostzaan is rather representative and, therefore, unit-based pricing can be rather 
effective for the Netherlands. 
 
We extend the literature in four directions. Firstly, we distinguish between different 
systems of unit-based pricing such as weight-based, bag-based, frequency-based and 
volume-based pricing. It is interesting to investigate other systems than weight-based 
systems as well, because the administrative costs and adverse effects like illegal 
dumping - two of the disadvantages of weight-based pricing - are much lower. 
Secondly, we investigate whether the political affiliation of a municipality is important 
for the size of the price effect. In earlier research we found only very weak evidence 
that political variables have influence on the institutional organization of refuse 
collection (Dijkgraaf et al., forthcoming). Thirdly, we test whether surrounding 
municipalities without a pricing system in fact collect part of the waste produced in 
municipalities with a unit-based pricing system. Finally, the paper concludes with a 
social cost-benefit analysis. Based on the estimated effects on the quantity of collected 
waste, we evaluate whether the different systems are beneficial and which system 
performs best from a social perspective. Not only the administrative costs, but also the 
effects on collection, treatment, dumping and environmental costs are included. It is 
shown that the social valuation of the effect on illegally dumped waste is essential for a 
proper analysis of the value of unit-based pricing systems. 
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2.  Effects of unit-based pricing 
 
2.1 Method and data  
 
In previous studies using cross-sections of municipalities waste per capita is a function 
of price, the municipality’s mean level of income, the share of homeowners, the age 
distribution, the average number of people in a household and other demographic 
variables (see e.g. Fullerton and Kinnaman, 1996).  
 
We use the quantity of collected waste (in kilogram per inhabitant) as the dependent 
variable. However, we are able to discriminate between different waste streams. In the 
Netherlands two types of  waste are collected separately at curbside: compostable waste 
such as vegetables, food and garden waste (VFG) and non-recyclable (or solid) waste. 
Furthermore, a number of recyclable materials such as glass, paper and textile (GPT) 
can be brought to special containers.2 The use of these containers is free of charge. In a 
survey of the Dutch Waste Management Council (AOO), weighing data on solid, 
compostable and recyclable waste are given for each municipality. Thus, we use not 
only total collected waste (per inhabitant) as the dependent variable, but also its 
components: solid, VFG and GPT waste. 
 
In our data set there is information available about the price system. Therefore, we 
included five dummies for the institutional form in which the price system is arranged, 
depending on whether the tariff is based on: 
• the weight of the garbage;  
• the number of collected bags; 
• the frequency of collection and the volume of the container; 
• the volume of the container; 
• other or mixed systems.  
 
Table 1.  Number of municipalities with price system 
   1998   1999   2000 
Weight 9 10 13 
Bag 21 20 22 
Volume and frequency 20 43 53 
Volume 24 27 24 
Other differentiated 6 8 10 
Total differentiated 80 108 122 
Total flat rate 458 430 416 
Total 538 538 538 
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2  In some municipalities there is a free curbside collection program for recyclable paper 
organized by local associations, such as sport clubs. Furthermore, most municipalities 
have a possibility for free collection of small quantities of chemical waste or tins as well. 
Due to the fact that this stream is very small it is not taken into account.  
Table 1 clearly shows that the number of Dutch municipalities with unit-based pricing is 
increasing. In 2000 23% of Dutch municipalities has a unit-based pricing system. 
Although increasing, the number of municipalities with weight-based pricing is 
relatively small. Maybe the administrative costs and potential effects on illegal dumping 
are for many municipalities a reason not to implement such a system. In contrast, the 
number of municipalities with unit-based pricing based on the volume of the container 
and the frequency of collection has increased in recent years. The number of 
municipalities with unit-based pricing only based on volume has stayed constant over 
recent years. As will be shown later on, this system is relatively ineffective in reducing 
the generation of waste. Furthermore, in 2000 10 municipalities have a mixed system 
due to changes in boundaries between municipalities. Although the number of 
municipalities using a unit-based pricing system is increasing, still the main part of the 
municipalities uses a flat tax. 
 
Furthermore, to correct for differences between the municipalities we include the 
following control variables: 
- the area of a municipality per inhabitant and its square (expected effect positive, 
especially for VFG waste); 
- the size of the average family (expected sign negative as larger family size probably 
leads to  less waste per inhabitant due to scale effects); 
- the percentage of non-western foreigners (expected sign negative); 
- the average income per inhabitant (expected sign positive); 
- houses owned per inhabitant (expected sign positive); 
- flats owned per inhabitant (expected sign negative, especially for VFG waste) 
- a dummy for small municipalities (expected sign positive as small municipalities 
produce generally more waste per inhabitant); 
- a dummy for large cities (expected sign negative for the opposite reason); 
- the percentage of retired people (expected sign unknown). 
These data come from the CBS (the Dutch Central Bureau for Statistics). In table 2 the 
descriptive statistics for the variables are given (see the appendix for the variable 
definition).3 
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3  In our dataset nearly all Dutch municipalities (538 in 2000) are included. The actual 
number of municipalities included differs per dependent variable due to data availability 
(see table 2).  
As data were available for 1998 till 2000 we estimate a panel model using both the 
cross-section as the time related variation.4 To correct for differences not captured by 
the control variables we include both fixed year and cross-section effects.5 
 
Table 2.  Descriptive statistics data 
 Mean Maximum Minimum Std. Dev. Number of 
observations 
Number of cross 
sections 
Wastetot 431 707 222 62 1323 507 
Wastesol 218 450 52 54 1451 530 
Wastevfg 117 239 12 39 1449 529 
Wastegpt 99 217 19 20 1334 508 
Diftarweight 0.02 1.00 0.00 0.14 1451 530 
Diftarbag 0.04 1.00 0.00 0.18 1451 530 
Diftarvolfre 0.07 1.00 0.00 0.26 1451 530 
Diftarvol 0.04 1.00 0.00 0.20 1451 530 
Diftaroth 0.01 1.00 0.00 0.12 1451 530 
Retire 0.13 0.28 0.06 0.03 1451 530 
Fam size 2.56 3.70 1.72 0.20 1451 530 
Foreigner 0.04 0.31 0.00 0.04 1451 530 
City 0.05 1.00 0.00 0.22 1451 530 
Village 0.57 1.00 0.00 0.50 1451 530 
Density 0.50 27.46 0.02 1.35 1451 530 
Ownhouse 10.05 30.59 1.34 3.12 1451 530 
Ownflat 1.68 16.53 0.00 2.20 1451 530 
Income 39.04 44.60 28.50 2.34 1451 530 
Impactweight 0.19 4.67 0.00 0.44 1451 530 
Impactbag 0.86 37.37 0.00 2.93 1451 530 
Impactvolfre 0.59 39.94 0.00 2.00 1451 530 
Impactvol 1.02 23.30 0.00 2.35 1451 530 
Impactoth 0.29 10.81 0.00 0.84 1451 530 
 
 
                                                          
4  We tested the assumption that pooling with respect to the different years is allowed. An 
F-test on the sum of squared residuals rejected this assumption on 99% (F-statistic is 
2.04, 24 restrictions, 1299 degrees of freedom). However, as the test statistic is near the 
level of significance (1.80) and the results for the most interesting variables are rather 
robust, we only present the results based on the pooled estimations. 
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5  Ideally we want to include a fixed-effect per municipality. However, as the unit-based 
pricing system dummies are highly invariant with respect to time, this is not possible. As 
a second best we include a dummy per province. Results for the fixed effects are 
available upon request. 
 
2.2  Results 
 
Table 3 presents the estimation results.6,7 The F-statistics show that the equations are 
significant, while the relatively high (adjusted) R2 indicate that the explained variation 
is not small. 
 
Table 3. Estimation results 
 log(Wastetot) log(Wastesol) log(Wastevfg) log(Wastegpt) 
Diftarweight -0.48 -0.68 -0.95 0.19 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) 
Diftarbag -0.24 -0.72 -0.07* 0.19 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) 
Diftarvolfre -0.24 -0.31 -0.47 0.09 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) 
Diftarvol -0.07 -0.13 -0.03# 0.02# 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) 
Diftaroth -0.16 -0.48 -0.00# -0.01# 
 (0.03) (0.04) (0.06) (0.05) 
log(Retire) 0.12 0.04# 0.32 0.08* 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.06) (0.04) 
log(Fam size) -0.21** -0.62 0.66 0.31* 
 (0.08) (0.11) (0.19) (0.16) 
log(Foreigner) -0.04 -0.00# -0.11 -0.02* 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) 
                                                          
6  We tested all specifications for heteroskedasticity using the Breusch-Pagan test. It 
showed that for estimations with the independent variables in levels nearly always 
heteroskedasticity could not be rejected. Therefore we estimate in logs. In cases where 
heteroskedasticity could still not be rejected, we corrected the standard errors with the 
White-procedure (see table 3). 
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7  We tested the robustness of the estimated coefficients for the unit-based pricing systems 
by estimating a wide variety of different equations. Excluding some of the control 
variables or including extra control variables (like the percentage of inhabitants with full-
time work, the percentage of western foreigners, the number of families with 1, 2 or 
more children, paid property tax and the size of the agriculture sector) shows that the 
estimated coefficients for the unit-based pricing systems are very robust. For example the 
coefficients for total waste are between –0.48 and –0.53 for the weight system and 
between –0.23 and –0.26 for the bag-system and the volume and frequency system. 
Further results are available upon request. 
 log(Wastetot) log(Wastesol) log(Wastevfg) log(Wastegpt) 
City -0.04 0.01# -0.21 -0.16 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.04) (0.03) 
Village 0.02** -0.03 0.08 0.05 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) 
log(Density) 0.03 0.09 0.02# 0.00# 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) 
log(Density)2 0.004* 0.028 -0.013 0.002# 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.005) (0.009) 
Ownhouse 0.002* 0.003* 0.014 0.002# 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) 
Ownflat -0.007 0.000# -0.025 -0.013 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) 
log(Income) 0.27 0.24 0.07# 0.26# 
 (0.06) (0.09) (0.15) (0.17) 
R2 (adjusted) 0.60 0.68 0.57 0.26 
F-statistic 71.48 110.08 69.12 17.92 
White-correction       Yes       No       No       Yes 
Fixed effects       Yes       Yes       Yes       Yes 
Observations     1323     1451     1449      1334 
Notes: Equations are estimated including a constant. Standard errors in parenthesis. All 
coefficients are significant at the 99% confidence interval, except for coefficients with **(*) 
which denotes significance at the 95(90) percent level and for coefficients with # which denotes 
non-significance at the usual levels. 
 
First, the estimations for the price system dummies will be discussed. Pricing waste on 
the basis of  its weight has a highly negative and significant effect on total waste of 
38%.8 This effect differs for the underlying waste streams. Compostable waste 
diminishes with more than 60%. It seems that many Dutch households use home 
composting methods to lower this type of waste.9 Also the effect on solid waste is large. 
Introducing a weighing system reduces the amount by nearly 50%. Many behavioral 
effects could lie behind these strong effects on the amount of waste presented for 
collection. From the estimations it is clear that one of the important mechanisms 
generating these results is that the amount of GPT waste increases when a unit-based 
                                                          
8  As the dependent variable is in logs the effects of the pricing dummies are calculated 
using ex-1, with x the estimated coefficient. 
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9  By introducing a weighing system some municipalities stimulate home composting by 
subsidizing the purchase of home compost containers (see Linderhof et al., 2001). 
pricing system is introduced. Clearly, introducing the weight-based system leads to 
higher efforts for recycling glass, paper and textiles (plus 21%). Of course this is due to 
the fact that Dutch citizens do not have to pay for the collection of this waste. 
 
As expected, the effects of the other unit-based pricing systems are smaller. Introducing 
a bag-based pricing system reduces the amount of total waste by 21%, mainly due to 
less solid waste (51%). As the bag-based system leaves VFG waste - as far as can be 
checked - unpriced, the effect of this system on VFG waste is small and insignificant at 
95%. Interestingly, the collection of GPT waste rises also with 21%, reassuring the 
assumption that households invest more in sorting their waste. 
 
The system based on frequency and volume reduces the total amount of waste by 21%, 
both due to a reduction of solid waste (27%) and VFG waste (38%). As the effects on 
solid waste are less pronounced, the stimulating effect on the collection of GPT waste is 
smaller (9%) as well. 
 
Less clear are the effects of introducing a system only based on the volume of the 
container. Total waste decreases with only 7%, mainly due to the effect on solid waste. 
Because there is no marginal pricing of extra waste, this is not surprising. 
 
Some of the control variables are interesting to look at. As suggested by the literature 
we find economies of scale for total waste. An increase in household size from 2 to 3 is 
found to reduce collected waste per inhabitant by 22,5%. Interestingly, there are 
diseconomies of scale for compostable waste. A possible explanation is that households 
with three or more persons have a larger chance to have a garden, while the amount of 
compostable waste is primarily determined by the existence of garden area.  
 
Moreover, for municipalities with a larger population of elderly or a smaller population 
of foreign people the amount of waste per capita is larger. This is especially the case for 
compostable waste. As the garden area of the household primarily determines the 
amount of compostable waste, it is clear that living in a city has a highly significant and 
negative effect on compostable waste and living in a village has a positive effect. 
Furthermore, as we should expect, the sign for the municipalities with many flats is 
negative for compostable waste. Moreover, more area in hectare per inhabitant increases 
the waste stream. The coefficient on income for total and solid waste is in accordance 
with the literature and positive, while income has no influence on VFG and GPT waste. 
 
3. Some further discussion of the results 
 
3.1  The price elasticities of the weight-based system 
 
In section 2 we estimated the effects of unit-based pricing systems using dummies for 
the different systems. However, more specific information on tariffs is available for the 
weight-based pricing system. This makes it possible to evaluate whether the approach 
leads to significant other results than using marginal prices.  
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Estimating the same equations as presented in table 3, but now with the marginal price 
substituted for the weight dummy, results in price coefficients of -1.34 (total waste), -
1.91 (solid waste), -2.64  (VFG waste) and 0.50 (GPT waste). All coefficients are 
significant at 99%.10 The implied elasticities evaluated at the sample means are -0.48, -
0.69, -0.96 and 0.18. 
 
The results for the elasticities are in line with Linderhof et al. (2001), although their 
elasticities for VFG (-1.39 (long run) and -1.10 (short run)) are above our results. As 
suggested by Linderhof et al. (2001) a possible explanation could be that the extensive 
public debate in Oostzaan boosted environmental awareness for VFG. 
 
It seems that the elasticities in Dutch studies are larger than those in US studies on unit-
based pricing. In a recent overview Kinnaman and Fullerton (1999) show that the price 
elasticities of unit-based pricing are between -0.1 and -0.4. Comparing these results with 
our weight system elasticity of –0.48 for total waste, it should be noticed that these 
studies also include other unit-based pricing systems which are of course less 
ineffective for marginal price setting. Nevertheless, there seems room for the impression 
that Dutch citizens are more environmentally conscious. 
 
3.2 The importance of political variables  
 
Linderhof et al. (2001) suggest that they possibly underestimate the effects of the 
weight-based system due to the political affiliation of Oostzaan: its citizens seem to be 
more than average environmentally conscious.11 However, they show that in the first 
year after the introduction of the weight-based pricing the amount of waste decreased 
with 30% and in the long run with 40%. As this result is comparable to the estimated 
effect of weight-based pricing systems in all Dutch municipalities, the political effect 
could be doubted. 
 
A more rigorous way to check political influence is to include the fractions of political 
parties based on the local election of March 1998 in the estimations presented in table 3. 
However, this shows that none of the Dutch political parties has a significant influence 
on the total amount of waste.12 Also in other research we found only very weak 
evidence that political variables have influence on the institutional organization of 
refuse collection (Dijkgraaf et al., forthcoming).  
                                                          
10  The results for the other variables are very close to table 3, which gives a further 
indication of the robustness of our results. Results are available on request. 
11  The largest political party in Oostzaan is Green Left (38% of total votes), which is the 
most environmentally friendly oriented political party in the Netherlands. Green Left 
received nation-wide only 7% of the votes in the parliamentary elections of 1998.  
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12  Some significant effects were found for solid, VFG and GPT waste, but coefficients are 
very small. When the liberal party VVD grows with 10% in votes, VFG waste increases 
with only 0.6%. While this increase is very small, the effects of other parties are still 
much lower. Results are available upon request. 
3.3 Is there an effect on surrounding municipalities? 
 
In section 2 we show that unit-based pricing has a significant effect on the total amount 
of collected waste. The estimations show that one of the reasons for this result is that 
more waste is sorted. However, no attention was paid to adverse behavioral effects. One 
of these effects is that unit-based pricing systems may introduce incentives to bring the 
waste to other municipalities without a unit-based pricing system. It seems logical to 
suppose that surrounding municipalities experience waste tourism as social contacts 
(family, friends) can be used to avoid the pricing system.  
 
To test whether municipalities collect part of the waste produced in surrounding 
municipalities with a unit-based pricing system, we estimate the models presented in 
table 3 including the following impact factors:  
)1(**)02.01( ,, i
j i
j
jiis SInh
Inh
DIF ∑ −=
with: 
 IFs,i  Impact factor of municipality i of unit-based pricing system s 
 Di,j Distance between municipality i and municipality j  
 Inhi Number of inhabitants of municipality i 
 Inhj Number of inhabitants of municipality j 
 Si Dummy with value 0 if municipality i itself has a unit-based pricing 
system.  
The impact factor for a municipality i is a function of the distance to and the size of 
municipalities j (municipalities with a unit-based pricing system). The impact factor is 
larger when: 
(i) The distance from a municipality with a unit-based pricing system to a 
municipality without such a system is smaller (assumed is a linear relation 
between impact and distance while only municipalities with a distance less than 50 
kilometers are included). Thus, we assume that bringing waste to relatives and 
acquaintances will be less interesting if the distance is larger. 
(ii) There are more surrounding municipalities with a unit-based pricing system. The 
distance from each municipality with a unit-based pricing system (when this 
distance is less than 50 kilometers) is included. 
(iii) A surrounding municipality is larger. A municipality introducing a unit-based 
pricing system with the same number of inhabitants as a surrounding municipality 
will have less influence on the collected quantity of waste on this last municipality 
than a municipality with 10 times as many inhabitants. 
The impact factor is zero when municipality i has itself a unit-based pricing system. The 
impact factors are calculated for the different unit-based pricing systems s. For example, 
IFweight,i is a measure for the impact on collected waste in a municipality without a unit-
based system of surrounding municipalities with a weight-based system. 
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Table 4.  Estimation results models with impact factors 
 log(Wastetot) log(Wastesol) log(Wastevfg) log(Wastegpt) 
IFweight 0.01# 0.03** 0.03# 0.02# 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) 
IFbag -0.00# 0.00# -0.00# -0.01* 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) 
IFvolfre -0.00# -0.01 0.00# 0.01** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) 
IFvol 0.00# -0.00 -0.00# -0.00# 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
IFoth 0.01 0.01# 0.04 -0.01# 
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Notes: Equations are estimated with the specifications presented in table 3. Results for other 
coefficients available on request. Standard errors in parenthesis. All coefficients are significant at 
the 99% confidence interval, except for coefficients with **(*) which denotes significance at the 
95(90) percent level and for coefficients with # which denotes non-significance at the usual 
levels. 
 
As is shown in table 4 the estimations give little indication for a significant effect of 
municipalities with a unit-based pricing system on surrounding municipalities without 
such a system. Only four coefficients are positive and significant. Furthermore, three of 
the four coefficients of the weight-system are insignificant at 90%, while this system is 
expected to have the largest effect on surrounding municipalities (evaluated at the mean, 
the significant effect of the weight-system is only 0.6% on the quantity of collected 
solid waste). 
 
To test for misspecification, we estimated also with a non-linear impact factor 
(decreasing with distance) skipping the scale effect. In this case only two coefficients 
are significant. Also other estimations, for example with impact factors, which are only 
zero if the same unit-based pricing system applies, produce few significant 
coefficients.13 Therefore, we conclude that bringing waste to municipalities without a 
unit-based pricing system is relative unimportant in the Netherlands.  
 
3.4 Illegal dumping 
 
The results of section 2 show that the implementation of the unit-based pricing system 
has strong effects on the amount of waste presented for collection. In the preceding 
section we showed that these effects are not related to bringing waste to municipalities 
without a unit-based pricing system. In this section the effect of illegal dumping is 
investigated. 
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13  As there was also no clear pattern in the results, except that most estimations result in 
insignificant variables, only the effects with the scale related linear impact factor are 
presented. Results are available on request. 
Fullerton and Kinnaman (1996) state that a unit-based pricing system provides 
pervasive incentives for households to dump waste illegally and thus incurs extra 
environmental costs. Newspaper articles are reported which imply that dumping had 
been substantial after the adoption of a unit-based pricing system in Charlottesville, 
Virginia. However, official statistics are not available. Therefore, they use a method of 
estimating the amount of illegal dumping by suspecting illegal dumping if the amount 
of waste fell to zero for a four-week period and the household indicated that “other” 
means were used to reduce waste. Based on this method they estimate that illegal 
dumping constitutes 28% of the total reduction in waste at the curb. 
 
Linderhof et al (2001) reports a study by the city of Oostzaan, which estimates that 
about 4-5% of the waste is brought to surrounding municipalities (which is 
approximately 13-17 % of the reduction). Furthermore, it was stated that illegal 
dumping is virtually non-existent. 
According to Linderhof et al. (2001) the monitoring system in Oostzaan, with fining 
illegal dumping, appears to be very effective in terms of deterrence. Moreover, another 
explanation for the absence of illegal dumping is that a small municipality as Oostzaan 
has a large degree of social control. 
  
However, Hong (1999) shows that dumping had been substantial after the adoption of 
the unit-based pricing system in Korea. Therefore, it is important to get more 
information about the size and social costs of illegal dumping to understand household 
solid waste management. In the next section it is shown that the attitude of society 
towards illegal dumping is very important for valuing the unit-based pricing systems. 
 
3.5  The social costs and benefits of volume pricing 
 
In this section we present a social cost-benefit analysis of the different systems 
compared to a flat tax system. Hereby, we quantify direct private costs such as 
collection and treatment costs and indirect environmental costs such as emissions and 
dumping costs. By including such costs the literature is extended.    
 
From a welfare point of view a number of effects are important with respect to the 
evaluation of unit-based pricing systems: 
1. The change in collection costs due to the effect on the collected quantity. 
2. The change in treatment costs due to the effect on the collected quantity. 
3. The change in administrative costs due to the introduction and maintenance of the 
unit-based pricing system. 
4. The social costs of extra illegal dumping due to the introduction of unit-based 
pricing system. 
 
Table 5 summarizes the collection and treatment costs per ton waste. As we are 
interested in the welfare effects of the different systems not only the out of pocket costs 
(private costs) are important, but also the effects on the environment of collection and 
treatment. 
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Table 5.  Social costs collection and treatment in euro per ton 
 Solid VFG GPT 
Private collection costs 41 41 5 
Private transport costs 30 30 30 
Private treatment costs 91 49 -53 
Total private costs 162 120 -18 
    
Environmental collection costs 0 0 0 
Environmental transport costs 1 0 0 
Environmental treatment costs 18 9 -173 
Total environmental costs 19 10 -173 
    
Total social costs 180 129 -191 
 
The table shows that the private collection costs are the same for solid and VFG waste. 
Thus, if a unit-based pricing system results in a decrease of total collection of one ton 
solid (or VFG) waste the total private collection costs diminish with 41 euro. However, 
as it is not reasonable to assume that a linear relationship exists between collected 
quantity of waste and total costs (because the same number of pickup-points remain), 
we assume that municipalities receive only 50% of this reduction in collection costs. As 
the collection infrastructure for GPT waste is based on a bring-system the private 
collection costs are much lower. The transport costs (including costs for transshipment) 
are the same for all types of waste. Here it is reasonable to assume that transport costs 
change linear with the quantity collected. 
 
Environmental collection costs are related to the effects of transport on the environment. 
If a unit-based pricing system results in less collection the environment is better off due 
to less emissions of the collection vehicle. However, as the average transport distance is 
not very high (less than 40 kilometers, based on EC (2001)), the total environmental 
collection costs are relatively low (at an estimated cost of 0.10 euro per tonkm, based on 
CE (1999)). Private treatment costs, which are based on the average Dutch costs, do 
differ between the different options (see Dijkgraaf et al., 1999 and 2001). Incineration 
of solid waste is the most expensive option (91 euro per ton), while recycling of GPT 
has a negative cost of 53 euro per ton (mostly due to the benefits of paper recycling).14 
 
The estimated environmental costs are dominated by emissions to air, water and bottom 
and the effects of the resulting chemical waste after treatment (Dijkgraaf and 
Vollebergh, 1998). Following Brisson (1997) composting waste results in less 
environmental costs than incineration while WS (2000) presents negative costs for 
recycling of GPT. This last figure is possible because the environmental costs of the 
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14  In the Netherlands hardly any solid waste from households is landfilled due to a landfill 
ban and tax (75 euro per ton). 
recycling process are much smaller than the environmental benefits due to saved 
emissions by the production of virgin materials. 
The system costs of the different unit-based pricing systems are based on an overview 
of evaluated systems in Dutch municipalities (VROM, 1997).15 As municipalities differ 
with respect to system costs, these costs are calculated as the average of the 
municipality with the cheapest cost per system and the most expensive municipality. As 
could be expected the weight-based pricing system is more expensive (8.11 euro per 
inhabitant) than the other systems (4.12 euro for the bag system, 6.54 euro for the 
volume and frequency system and 4.36 euro for the volume system). 
 
The previous section gives the information needed to calculate the effects of unit-based 
pricing on social costs. Table 6 presents the results. The weight-based and bag-based 
systems perform best in terms of environmental costs. It should be noticed that the 
weight-based and the bag-based system decrease the amount of solid waste with large 
environmental costs substantially and increase the amount of recyclable waste with high 
environmental benefits also substantially. From the view of private costs the weight-
based system performs better than the other systems. The reason for this is the higher 
savings on collected waste. Therefore, in social terms the weight-based system performs 
slightly better than the bag-based system. Moreover, the volume and frequency system 
performs better than the flat rate and the volume system is even worse, although the 
differences are rather small. 
 
Table 6.  Total costs per system (level for flat-rate and change for other systems) 
Costs Flat rate
(level) 
Weight 
(change)
Bag 
(change)
Vol. and Freq.
(change) 
Volume 
(change) 
Total private costs 45 -14 -12 -6 +1 
Total environmental costs -12 -6 -6 -3 -0 
Total social costs 33 -20 -18 -9 +0 
 
In table 6 the effect on illegal dumping is not included. However, as the political debate 
is most concerned about this issue, it is important to get hold on the effect of this issue. 
First of all, the effect of unit-based pricing systems on the quantity of illegally dumped 
waste is important. As a basis we use the figure of Fullerton and Kinnaman (1996) who 
estimate that 28% of the decrease in waste leaks away. We assume that the illegal effect 
is linear to the reduction in waste of a specific unit-based pricing system. Thus, the 
illegal effect is the highest for the weight-based system (28%) and the lowest for the 
volume system (6%).16 
 
                                                          
15  The administrative costs for 1997 are given in 2000 prices. 
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16  Of course different figures for these effects are estimated in the literature. However, the 
uncertainty in these effects is captured in the different shadow prices we use for the 
estimation of the effect of illegal dumping in monetary terms. 
The costs of illegal dumping are harder to obtain. One possible method is to estimate 
the costs of collection and treatment of illegally dumped waste. Another method is to 
use a willingness to pay price for people to accept the littering of their environment. 
Unfortunately, for both methods no real figures are available. We therefore show 
whether the main results of table 6 are robust for different levels of the willingness to 
pay for illegally dumped waste (the 'shadow price'). 
 
Table 7.  Total change in social costs per system 
Shadow price illegal 
dumping 
Weight Bag Vol. And Freq. Volume 
0 -20 -18 -9 0 
50 -18 -17 -8 0 
100 -17 -16 -8 1 
181 -15 -14 -7 1 
250 -13 -13 -7 1 
500 -6 -9 -5 1 
1000 7 -1 1 1 
5000 112 74 32 5 
 
If the shadow price of illegally dumped waste is zero the results are (of course) the same 
as for the situation that no waste is illegally dumped (see table 7). When the shadow 
price of illegal dumping raises the unit-based systems become less attractive compared 
to the flat rate system. When the shadow price is 180 euro per ton (the social costs for 
one ton solid waste at the curbside), the weight-based system is socially still preferred, 
although the difference with the bag system is almost zero. It seems reasonable to 
assume that the social valuation of illegal dumping is above the level of 180 euro per 
ton. However, the shadow price of illegal dumping should be raised almost four times 
for the flat rate to perform better than the weight-based system. Therefore, from a social 
point of view there seems room for further implementation of weight-based or bag-
based pricing systems. If the shadow price of illegal dumping is approximately 750 
euro, social costs are equal for both systems. In this case the bag and volume and 
frequency system still produce social benefits. However, when the shadow price is more 
than 1072 euro, which can be interpreted as extreme dislike of society for illegal 
dumping, the flat rate system is preferred above all other systems.  
 
4.  Conclusions 
 
This paper provides an empirical analysis of the effects of unit-based pricing of 
household waste for the Netherlands. We find significant and sizeable effects for 
weight-based, bag-based and frequency-based pricing systems. For example, weight-
based pricing shows to be effective in reducing solid waste (-49%) and compostable 
waste (-61%) and increasing recyclable waste (+21%). This is in line with our results by 
Linderhof et al. (2001) for Oostzaan. Moreover, bag-based pricing is also effective in 
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reducing solid waste (-51%) and increasing recyclable waste (+21%). This is an 
interesting result, because administrative costs for bag-based pricing are much lower.  
 
Moreover, we show that the political affiliation of a municipality is unimportant for the 
size of the price effect and that there is no evidence that surrounding municipalities 
without a pricing system in fact collect part of the waste produced in municipalities with 
a unit-based pricing system. Less evidence is available for the size of illegal dumping. 
Based on earlier estimates by Fullerton and Kinnaman (1996), we show that if the social 
valuation of illegal dumping is in line with the costs of collecting and treating solid 
waste the weight-based system (or bag system) is preferable.  
 
From a social point of view there seems room for a further implementation of especially 
weight- and bag-based system. Both decrease the amount of solid waste with high 
environmental costs substantially and increase the amount of recyclable waste with 
large environmental benefits, which compensate the system costs. As the main 
disadvantage of these systems is the effect on illegal dumping, it seems worthwhile to 
investigate an effective monitoring and fining system and the conditions under which 
such a system works.  
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APPENDIX 
 
Definition of variables 
Wastetot Total collected waste per inhabitant 
Wastesol Total collected solid waste per inhabitant 
Wastevfg Total collected vegetable, fruit and garden waste per inhabitant 
Wastegpt Total collected glass, paper and textile waste per inhabitant 
Diftarweight Dummy if inhabitant pays per kilogram 
Diftarbag Dummy if inhabitant pays per bag 
Diftarvolfre Dummy if inhabitant pays related to volume of waste bin and frequency of 
collection 
Diftarvol Dummy if inhabitant pays related to volume of waste bin 
Diftaroth Dummy if inhabitant pays related to some other quantity measure 
Retire Percentage of inhabitants older than 65 
Fam size Number of inhabitants per household 
Foreigner Number of non-western foreigners per inhabitant 
City Dummy for municipalities with more than 100,000 inhabitants 
Village Dummy for municipalities with less than 20,000 inhabitants 
Density Area of municipality in hectare per inhabitant 
Ownhouse Number of real estate houses sold per inhabitant 
Ownflat Number of real estate flats sold per inhabitant 
Income Percentage of inhabitants with middle income (more than 12.400, less than 
21.400 euro) 
Impactweight Variable measuring surrounding municipalities with weight-based pricing 
system 
Impactbag Variable measuring surrounding municipalities with bag-based pricing 
system 
Impactvolfre Variable measuring surrounding municipalities with volume and 
frequency-based pricing system 
Impactvol Variable measuring surrounding municipalities with volume-based pricing 
system 
Impactoth Variable measuring surrounding municipalities with other-based pricing 
system 
 
 20
REFERENCES 
 
Brisson, I., 1997, Assessing the Waste Hierarchy, a Social Cost-Benefit Analysis of 
Municipal Solid Waste Management in the European Union (AKF Forlaget, 
Copenhagen). 
CE, 1999, Efficiënte prijzen voor het verkeer (“Efficient Transport Prices”) (CE, Delft). 
Dijkgraaf, E. and H.R.J. Vollebergh, 1998, Incineration or Dumping? A Social Cost 
Comparison of Waste Disposal Options, OCFEB Research Memorandum 9808 
(OCFEB, Rotterdam). 
Dijkgraaf, E., R.F.T. Aalbers and M. Varkevisser, 1999, Afvalmarkt in de branding 
(“Waste Market at Risk”), OCFEB Studies in Economic Policy, no. 2 (OCFEB, 
Rotterdam). 
Dijkgraaf, E., R.F.T. Aalbers and M. Varkevisser, 2001, Afvalprijzen zonder grens. Een 
analyse van de Nederlandse afvalverbrandingsinstallaties in een Europese markt 
(“Waste Prices Without Borders. An Analysis of the Position of Dutch Waste 
Incineration Plants in a European Market”), OCFEB Studies in Economic Policy, 
no. 4 (OCFEB, Rotterdam). 
Dijkgraaf, E., R.H.J.M. Gradus and B. Melenberg, forthcoming, The Institutional 
Choice of Refuse Collection: Determining Variables in the Netherlands, Empirical 
Economics. 
EC, 2001, Waste Management Options and Climate Change (EC, Brussels).  
Fullerton, D. and T.C. Kinnaman, 1996, Household Responses to Pricing Garbage by 
the Bag, American Economic Review 86(4), 971-984. 
Hong, S., R.M. Adams and H.A. Love, 1993, An Economic Analysis of Household 
Recycling of Solid Waste: The Case of Portland, Oregon, Journal of 
Environmental Economics and Management 25(23), 136-146. 
Hong, J., 1999, The Effect of Unit Pricing System Upon Household Solid Waste 
Management: The Korean Experience, Journal of Environmental Management 57, 
1-10. 
Jenkins, R.R., 1993, The Economics of Solid Waste Reduction: The Impact of User 
Fees (Edward Elgar, Aldershot). 
Kinnaman, T.C. and D. Fullerton, 1997, Garbage and Recycling in Communities with 
Curbside Recycling and Unit-based Pricing, NBER Working Paper 6021 (NBER, 
Cambridge). 
Kinnaman, T.C. and D. Fullerton, 1999, The Economics of Residential Solid Waste 
Management, NBER Working Paper 7326 (NBER, Cambridge). 
Linderhof, V., P. Kooreman, M. Allers and D. Wiersma, 2001, Weight-based Pricing in 
the Collection of Household Waste: The Oostzaan Case, Resource and Energy 
Economics 23, 359-371. 
Podolsky, M.J. and M. Speigel, 1998, Municipal Waste Disposal: Unit-pricing and 
Recycling Opportunities, Public Works Management and Policy 3(1), 27-39. 
Reschovky, J.D. and S.E. Stone, 1994, Market Incentives to Encourage Household 
Waste Recycling: Paying for what you Throw Away, Journal of Policy Analysis 
and Management 13(1), 120-139. 
 21
VROM, 1997, Ervaringen met tariefdifferentiatie en huishoudelijk afval (“Experience 
with Differentiated Tariffs and Domestic Waste”) (Ministry of Environmental 
Affairs, Den Haag). 
Wertz, K.L., 1976, Economic Factors Influencing Households’ Production of Refuse, 
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 2, 263-272. 
WS, 2000, Waste Strategy 2000 (Department of the Environment, Transport and the 
Regions, London). 
 22
